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On Being as a whole and Being-a-whole 
Many—probably most—interpreters react to the fact that Being and Time is 
merely a ‘torso’  by setting aside ‘the Question of Being’. Instead they set about 1
stripping the body for what might yet prove to be assets in the context of some project 
or other of their own. In contrast, John Haugeland boldly insisted that  
Everything in Being and Time has to do with the question of being ... [For 
example, t]he existential concepts are introduced for this reason and this 
reason only. Our task as readers is to understand how. (Haugeland 2000, 66) 
I confess that this strikes me as a pure act of faith on Haugeland’s part. I have argued 
elsewhere that we have plenty of reason to wonder whether the best reference point 
by which to understand Heidegger’s early thought is ‘the Question of Being’ and, with 
it, ‘the Being and Time project’—as I will call it—the broader project to which the 
published book was declared to be contributing.  That project is only one of a number 2
of ‘frames’ that Heidegger sets around his work in the 1920s and one that he abandons 
within a couple of years of the book’s publication.  3
He does so seemingly because of continuing dissatisfaction with his own 
efforts to bring it to fruition. A case could be made for thinking that we have much of 
 This is Spiegelberg’s well-known description, quoted in, e.g., Kisiel 2005: 189.1
 Cf. McManus 2012: ch. 9.2
 As the two available translations of Sein und Zeit also give the pagination of the 3
German original, I will give references to the latter, though generally I will follow the 
translation of Macquarrie and Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962). I use the 
established translations of Heidegger’s works in most cases, but diverge from them on 
occasion.
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the material that might have made up Part Two of the completed book. But there are 
fewer reasons for such optimism with respect to Division Three of Part One. 
Retrospectively Heidegger talks of that division being ‘held back’ (LH 231) and—as 
early as 1929 (EG 105 n. b)—he identified the 1927 Basic Problems of 
Phenomenology lectures as a ‘new elaboration of the Third Division of the First Part 
of Being and Time’ (BP 1). These comments suggest that, in essence, the work was 
done but never reached quite the publishable form Heidegger sought; and that may 
seem to be confirmed by Heidegger’s report in 1941 that—through conversations with 
Jaspers in December 1926 and January 1927—‘it became clear to me that the 
elaboration of this all important Division (I, 3) drafted up to that point had to be 
incomprehensible’.  But in the same letter, he continues:  4
Of course, at the time I thought that in the course of the year everything could 
be said more clearly. That was a delusion. 
So Heidegger’s opinion in 1941 suggests that nothing he had written since Being and 
Time—Basic Problems included—quite added up to that missing division.  5
 Having said all of the above, I have also argued elsewhere that interesting 
possibilities may still open up if we do take seriously the ‘Question of Being’ and the 
particular framing of Heidegger’s early thought that we find in Being and Time. In 
particular, I have offered an account of the project to which that book was devoted, 
the work left to Division Three, and the importance of that work, along with—
however—reasons to think there may be problems of principle that prevent such a 
completion.  According to that account, Heidegger envisaged the Being and Time 6
project as solving a problem that Aristotle revealed and that Heidegger’s own insights
—into the diverse forms that the Being of entities takes—exacerbated. The problem is 
that there is reason to think that the very possibility of the discipline of ontology 
 Translation quoted from Kisiel 1993, 4864
 There are also clear indications in BP itself that he feels the task he set himself there 5
remains unfinished. Cf, e.g., BP 308.
 Cf. McManus 2013b.6
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presupposes that there is sense to the idea of ‘Being in general’ and reason to think 
that there is no such sense. What I want to do here is suggest one way that the account 
I have offered might be filled out, in particular, by sketching a way in which the 
discussion of authenticity in Being and Time might have been structurally significant 
for the above project. 
1. Phenomenology, ontology, and diversity 
In Being and Time, Heidegger bemoans the baleful influence of the “priority 
of the present-at-hand [Vorhanden] in traditional ontology” (SZ 147), “the domination 
of the ontology of the ‘substantial’” (SZ 320 n. xix) .  He argues that we must instead 7
recognize diverse forms of Being, distinguishing, for example, Vorhandenheit from 
Zuhandenheit (readiness-to-hand), from the mode of Being of the world within which 
entities of those sorts are found, and from that of the entity that encounters them in 
that world, Dasein.  8
Heidegger maintains that the “priority” of the Vorhanden exists in a symbiotic 
relationship with a corresponding and similarly baleful “priority” of “pure beholding 
[puren Anschauen]” (SZ 147); for this reason, a recognition of the diverse forms that 
our understanding of entities takes may also help to break up prejudices about the 
‘objects’ of that understanding, a kind of phenomenological reflection on the ways in 
which those objects are grasped revealing the diverse ontological forms that they 
take.   So, for example, though we may grasp the Vorhanden through “pure 9
 This equation of the Vorhanden with substances is often made—see e.g. Guignon 7
1983: 101 and 144, and Dreyfus 1991: 71—but is problematic. McManus 2012: ch. 3 
discusses these worries but I set them aside here.
 Other forms of Being that Heidegger seems to entertain but which he does not 8
discuss at any length in Being and Time include those instantiated by animals, God 
and truth. I discuss the second of these briefly in a moment and the third in Sec. 8. 
 Or so I argue in McManus 2012.9
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beholding,”  we grasp the Zuhanden by being “occupied with it in using it” (HCT 10
191) and other Dasein through “Being-with” (SZ 113); and recognizing this diversity
—in what Heidegger at one stage calls ‘subject-correlates [Subjektkorrelate]’ —11
helps us ”broaden the idea of objectivity,” the latter “exhibited in its content in the 
investigation of the corresponding intuition” (HCT 72). We tend to overlook the 
diversity such ‘intuitions’—such ‘subject-correlates’—take too but, by remedying this 
Verstehensvergessenheit, we can expose the symbiotically-related 
Seinsvergessenheit.  12
There may seem to be a circularity in this approach: one would seem to need a 
grasp of Zuhandenheit, for example, if one is to identify which mode of understanding 
of ours is our understanding of the Zuhanden. But Heidegger believes we have such a 
grasp anyway: “Being is never alien but always familiar, ‘ours’” (MFL 147). The 
problem is that—in a sense—we ‘forget’ it. As Dasein, our mode of existence is one 
of “understanding Being” (SZ 12). But that understanding—which is manifest in our 
adept everyday dealings with the variety of entities we encounter—fails to inform our 
reflections on such entities and such understanding. Instead we fixate on entities 
possessed of a particular mode of Being—‘the substantial’—and its ‘subject-
correlate’—‘pure beholding’. The phenomenological response described above is a 
technique to aid ‘recollection’ of other modes of understanding and, through that, of 
other modes of Being.  13
An early example of this recollecting reflection in action can be found in 
Heidegger’s lectures on St Paul and St Augustine. There Heidegger approaches “the 
 For complications I will not discuss here that concern Heidegger’s understanding of 10
how we grasp the Vorhanden, see McManus 2012: chs. 3 and 8.
 Cf., e.g., IPPW 37, PRL 240, 241 etc.11
 The connection between phenomenology and ontology that I sketch here is looser 12
than that which Heidegger seems to defend in SZ. (Cf., e.g., SZ 35 and 38, and for one 
interpretation, see Braver, introduction to this volume.) But I will set that worry aside 
here.
 For further discussion, see McManus 2012, sec. 1.1, and of this notion of 13
“recollection” in particular, McManus 2013c
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task … to determine the sense of the objecthood of God” (PRL 67)—“[t]he sense of 
the Being of God” (PRL 84)—by starting “from the modes of access”, from a proper 
appreciation of the “original region of life and performance of consciousness (or 
feeling), in which religion alone realizes itself as a certain form of experience” (PRL 
222, 243). By placing such a ‘subject-correlate’ first in our thinking, we may shake 
off the temptation to fall into thinking of God “by analogy with the theoretical and the 
constitution of the object of cognition”, a temptation that distorts our “experiential 
comportment to God” into a “holding-as-true” and God into “simply a special 
object” (PRL 232, 149). By reflecting instead on God as the “correlate of the act-
character of ‘faith’” (PRL 252)—as the recipient of prayer, love and service —we 14
resist the corresponding ontological assimilation and open up the possibility of 
recognizing God’s “originary objectity [Objectität]” (PRL 252).  15
 But while his early work stresses such diversity, Heidegger also insists that 
“the question that determined the way of [his] thought” is ‘what is the simple, unitary 
determination of Being that permeates all its manifold meanings?’ (LR x) The “quest” 
for an answer to this question became—as Heidegger retrospectively put it—“the 
relentless impetus for the treatise Being and Time” (CV 9); “[t]he question of the 
possible multiplicity of Being and therewith at the same time that of the unity of the 
concept of Being in general” was for him “urgent”, “demand[ing] to be raised” (BP 
120, 282). So why? 
2. Diversity and fragmentation 
In the 1924-25 lecture series on Plato’s Sophist, Heidegger celebrates 
Parmenides’ formulation of ‘the seemingly trivial principle’, ‘beings are’ (PS 303). 
This, Heidegger proposes, represented ‘the very first decisive inception of 
ontology’ (PS 307): 
 Cf. PRL 79, 107, 234, and 254.14
 For further discussion of this example, cf. McManus 2012: sec. 1.2 and, in greater 15
detail, 2013a.
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The ancients tried to clarify and make intelligible beings …—what is already 
there—by deducing them from particular beings. [But] Parmenides … 
considers beings as such, i.e., he sets apart the whole of beings in an ontic 
sense and says that ‘they are’. (PS 302) 
Parmenides’ breakthrough was to attempt to ‘enter into the dimension of the Being of 
beings’ (PS 305), to reach—so to speak—for a concept of ‘Being’, for a ‘feat’ or 
feature that all entities share in simply by virtue of the fact that ‘they are’.  
But his successors recognized the true difficulty of that venture, Plato insisting 
that ‘there must be manifold Being’ (PS 307) and Aristotle that ‘Being is said in many 
ways’ (Aristotle, Metaphysics, Γ 2 1003a33). The difficulty is not merely that such 
ontological diversity would seem to call for a general ontological theory of greater 
complexity; it may also seem to cast doubt on the very possibility of such a theory, by 
casting doubt on whether there is a singular subject-matter for any such theory to 
address. 
Heidegger reports that he found the “urgent” question of “the unity of the 
concept of Being in general” “concealed” in Aristotle (LR x);  and there are several 16
ways in which the latter’s thought can raise the above doubt. G. E. L. Owen spells out 
one.  17
In [Aristotle’s] view, to be was to be something or other: for a threshold, he 
says, ‘to be’ means “to have such and such a position,” for ice it means “to 
have solidified in such and such a way.” And at the level of greatest generality, 
to be is to be either a substance of some sort or a relation or a quality or a 
member of some other category. There is no general sense to the claim that 
something exists over and above one of the particular senses. (Owen 1986, 
181) 
 Cf. LR x, CV 9 and TB 74 on this and the important role that Brentano’s study of 16
Aristotle (Brentano 1975) played in revealing that question’s presence to Heidegger.
 McManus 2013b: sec. 3 spells out another.17
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If there is no such general sense that subsumes the particulars—and hence “no class 
of existing things which will embrace men and miles and modesty” (Owen 1986, 216)
—then “a single synoptic science of all existing things” (Owen 1986, 278) would 
seem to lack a topic. 
Heidegger’s own stress on ontological diversity makes such a worry over the 
“the disintegration [Zerfall]” of Being (AM 23) more vivid still. When one says a 
zuhanden item exists, a vorhanden item exists and another Dasein exists, one says—
roughly speaking—that something is useable for some purpose, that something 
occupies a certain space, and that we share an understanding of the world with 
someone  But what entitles us to think that these are variations on a single 18
“achievement” or “feat”—“existence”, “Being”? Even if the most pressing “task” for 
ontology is “classifying the whole of Being into regions” (PRL 41)—“partition[ing] 
the totality of beings” (PRL 39)—there must still be such a “totality”—such a 
“whole” —if such a partitioning is to be a contribution to something that merits the 19
name ‘ontology’—“a science … [that] stud[ies] all things that are, qua 
being” (Aristotle, Metaphysics, Γ 2 1003b 15-16). If there isn’t “any single unifying 
concept of Being in general that would justify calling these different ways of Being 
ways of Being” (BP 176), then whatever distinctions we may be marking, they will 
not be entitled to the label ‘ontological distinctions’. 
This worry can show up in other ways: for instance, as a worry about the 
perspective from which the ontologist might draw her distinctions. If we grasp the 
Vorhanden through “pure beholding” and the Zuhanden by being “occupied with it in 
 Cf. BP on how a Zuhanden item is individuated not by ‘space- and time-position’ 18
but by ‘its equipmental character and equipmental contexture’: ‘functionality’ is 
‘exactly what makes [such a] thing what it is’ (BP 292, 164). ‘[T]o exist’, which is 
Dasein’s distinctive mode of Being, on the other hand, ‘is essentially … to 
understand’ (BP 276).
 I will treat the expressions, ‘Being in general’ and ‘Being as a whole’, as 19
interchangeable here. Though there may be issues here, Heidegger’s own note to SZ 
37 (published in the Stambaugh translation of SZ) would seem to sanction this.
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using it”, through which ‘subject-correlate’ might one have the difference between 
such entities in view? We may come to worry that there is no single unifying concept 
of ‘understanding’ or ‘grasping’ entities that would justify calling ‘pure beholding’ 
and ‘being occupied with something’ ‘ways of understanding or grasping’, or any 
perspective from which the difference between these entities—that such ‘ways of 
understanding or grasping’ understand or grasp—might be understood or grasped. 
Polt has suggested that ‘Heidegger assumes’ that, although “Being takes 
various forms”, “all the varieties of Being cohere, … so that we can ask what it means 
to be in general” (Polt 2005, 2). It would be fairer to say not that Heidegger makes 
this assumption, but rather that he believes both that we all make this assumption—‘if 
we conceive of philosophical cognition as something possible and necessary’ (SZ 16)
—and that this is an assumption to which we must show we are entitled.  20
3. The Being and Time Project 
Aristotle offers one way of meeting the latter need, proposing that, though 
“there are many senses in which a thing is said to be, … all refer to one starting-
point”: 
 Another way of thinking of the importance of identifying such a unifying sense 20
arises out of Heidegger’s description of philosophical confusion as our using words 
whose meaning has descended into “indeterminate emptiness” (HCT 269).  Just as 
Heidegger worries—for example—over whether (and, if so, how) “the possibility of 
being itself” is “attested” in Dasein’s lived experience, so too one might wonder 
whether ‘Being in general’ has a “demonstrable meaning” (SZ 23, 59). “The 
fundamental concepts of metaphysics” might then “amount to nothing more than the 
possession of words”, having ”a neutral, faded content” by virtue of not ”originally 
aris[ing] from” any determinate ”sphere of experience” (PRL 246, IPR 7). (For 
discussion, cf. McManus 2013c.) In response, the account below would identify— 
‘attested’ in the life of Dasein—an ‘experience’ from which an idea of ‘Being in 
general’ might ‘arise’. 
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[S]ome things are said to be because they are substances, others because they 
are affections of substance, others because they are a process towards 
substance, or destructions or privations or qualities of substance, or productive 
or generative of substance, or of things which are relative to substance, or 
negations of one of these things or of substance itself. (Metaphysics Γ 2 1003b 
5-18) 
As Owen glosses this view, “[t]he primary sense’ of ‘Being’ “is that in which 
substances … exist” and the “others … are variously derivative”, in that the notion of 
substance “reappear[s] as a common element in our analyses of the existence of non-
substances such as colours or times or sizes.” (Owen 1986, 217)  But for Heidegger, 21
this view precisely exhibits “the domination of the ontology of the ‘substantial’”. 
The project to which Being and Time was to have contributed offered an 
alternative response: something else is to play the kind of role that substance plays for 
Aristotle, namely, time. Heidegger’s “provisional aim” in Being and Time is “the 
interpretation of time as the possible horizon for any understanding of Being” (SZ 1): 
“[w]ithin the horizon of time the projection of a meaning of Being in general can be 
accomplished” (SZ 235, italics added). If so, time “enabl[es] … the thematic 
interpretation of Being and of its articulation and manifold ways,” and “thus makes 
ontology possible” (BP 228). 
But we cannot leap straight to this conclusion—not least, because we cannot 
claim to know what it means once Heidegger has warned us that the “time” in 
question is not time as it has been “ordinarily understood” (SZ 17). Indeed Heidegger 
sees the latter as yet another expression of “the domination of the ontology of the 
‘substantial’”: through a process of “levelling off”, time is itself rendered a sequence 
of ‘nows’ that are “somehow vorhanden” (SZ 422, 423). Considerations of what 
Being in general is face similar prejudices to those that blind us to the nature of the 
Zuhanden, Dasein, world etc. So even if we have the sophistication to think that 
Being in general has something to do with time—perhaps in recognition of time’s 
 Heidegger discusses this view at BCAP 126-27, 133-36 and 222, and AM 27-39.21
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having acted throughout philosophy’s history as an ‘“index” for the differentiation 
and delimitation of domains of Being as such’ (HCT 5)—here too “the domination of 
the ‘substantial’” is waiting in the wings in the form of the ‘ordinary conception of 
time’. 
So how then are we to proceed? I will tentatively suggest that Heidegger 
employs here too the approach that Sec. 1 sketched. We saw there how Heidegger 
seeks to break our ontological prejudices through a phenomenological re-duction—
literally, a leading back to the ways in which entities show themselves to us. This 
approach frees up our ontology of x by asking what understanding x ‘looks like’—
what the subject who intends x has to be like. We see this in Being and Time’s 
reflections on how we grasp the Zuhanden, the Vorhanden and other Dasein; and my 
suggestion here is that the overarching Being and Time project might perhaps be seen 
as extending this treatment to the particular and metaphilosophically crucial case of 
Being in general: it would free up our vision of Being in general by asking what 
understanding Being in general ‘looks like’, what the subject who intends Being in 
general has to be like. Though, in one sense, all Dasein grasp Being in general 
constantly, I will suggest that—for Heidegger—we only see what this actually 
amounts to when we consider the demands of authenticity: there is a further sense in 
which a condition of Dasein’s acknowledging Being as a whole is Dasein’s having 
achieved a kind of wholeness itself, a wholeness that only the authentic achieve. 
4. Division Two and the question of Dasein’s wholeness 
Heidegger opens Division Two of Being and Time with a discussion of the 
question of what it is for Dasein to be a whole. But this discussion can seem odd and 
under-motivated. He claims that we cannot speak of Dasein as being ‘whole’ in the 
ways that, for example, we may speak of a zuhanden object being whole;  we may 22
imagine striving to grasp Dasein when it is ‘complete’, for example, but that would be 
 Cf. SZ sec. 46-48 and HCT 311.22
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to ‘grasp’ it when it is dead and gone. Seemingly on the basis of such failures, he then 
drives us into a consideration of death and Being-towards-death. 
But it is easy to feel uncomfortable with this. Fleischer, for example, sees no 
real need as being met when Heidegger presents the investigations embodied in 
Division Two as necessary by virtue of our not having yet grasped Dasein as a whole, 
since Heidegger has already offered the notion of “care” as encapsulating what it is 
for Dasein to be in its entirety (Fleischer 1991, 39, 196). Why isn’t this an adequate 
form of wholeness for our analysis to have achieved? Heidegger may very well have 
reasons to move us on to discuss Being-towards-death; but is this lack of wholeness
—“the question of arriving at the wholeness of Dasein” if we are to “mak[e] Dasein 
available as an object for consideration” (HCT 310)—a good one? 
Heidegger as much as accepts this worry later in the book. In the light of his 
analysis of death, conscience, guilt, etc., 
[T]he question of Dasein’s potentiality-for-being-a-whole … slough[s] off the 
character indicated at the beginning [of Division Two], when we treated it as if 
it were just a theoretical or methodological question of the analytic of Dasein, 
arising from the endeavour to have the whole of Dasein completely “given”. 
(SZ 309). 
As he puts it in HCT, that question “is the secondary difficulty”: 
The primary one is whether Dasein is the entity which one oneself is and 
which of its essence entails that it be in each case mine, and whether this 
entity has the possibility to be its wholeness. It is only on the basis of this 
possibility of being that we could have the further possibility of experiencing 
this self-being of Dasein in its wholeness now also in an explicit fashion. 
(HCT 310-11) 
The ‘primary difficulty’ then is establishing the sense in which Dasein can be whole, 
the ‘secondary difficulty’ being the ‘methodological’ question of whether we can get 
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such a whole in view. But why then bring the ‘secondary difficulty’ up in the first 
place? Why give the question of Dasein’s wholeness such importance in introducing 
Division Two’s deepening analysis of authenticity into the work of the Being and 
Time project? 
In an effort to elucidate one possible way of understanding why authenticity 
matters to that project,  and of seeing a genuine methodological necessity in turning 23
to reflections on Dasein’s wholeness, I propose that those who ‘flee’ from the above 
“possibility of [Dasein’s] being” a whole also ‘flee’ from a disclosure of ‘Being in 
general’. There is a sense, which I will explain, in which it is only those who realise 
that possibility that ‘condense’ into unified perspectives on things; and by grasping 
the formal structure of their mode of existence—the structure it has by virtue of being 
a unified perspective on things, whatever ‘content’ that perspective might have—we 
uncover what could be called the “horizon” within which “the projection of a meaning 
of Being in general can be accomplished”.  24
5. Authenticity as the ‘Subject-Correlate’ of Being as a Whole 
 In the Sophist lectures, Heidegger considers Socrates’ description of the true 
philosopher as one who “looks down upon life from above”; “[t]hat implies”, 
Heidegger tells us, 
that the philosopher himself, in order to be able to carry out such a possibility 
in earnest, must have attained a mode of existence guaranteeing him the 
possibility of such a look and thereby making accessible to him life and 
existence in general. (PS 168) 
 The basis of others can be found in McManus 2012: sec. 9.2, and 2013c.23
 What follows draws on a broader understanding of authenticity that I cannot defend 24
here. I present aspects of this in McManus (forthcoming-a), (forthcoming-b) and in 
as-yet-unpublished work.
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Dasein’s mode of being is, of course, one of Sein-bei entities—being amidst them (SZ 
54)—and hence it does not “look down upon life” even when it grasps Being in 
general. But that is not to deny that it does indeed—“somehow”—grasp it: 
As surely as we can never comprehend [erfassen] absolutely the whole of 
beings in themselves we certainly do find ourselves stationed [gestellt] in the 
midst of [inmitten] beings that are revealed somehow as a whole. (WM 87) 
Our efforts to comprehend particular kinds of entities bring with them, however, a 
kind of concealing of this whole. “The originary disclosure of beings as a whole” is 
an “open[ing] up [of] the open region [das Offene] for every measure” (OET 143)—
for each particular way in which we may classify or evaluate what we find around us. 
But when such a ‘measure’ “lets beings be in a particular comportment that relates to 
them and thus discloses them, it conceals beings as a whole” (OET 148). Any such 
measure embodies “only one kind and possibility of making manifest of entities” (EP 
203) and, therefore, in adopting it, one forfeits the possibility of addressing other 
aspects of the world. “So much for the ‘revelation of beings somehow as a whole’!”, 
one might say. But Heidegger’s discussion of authenticity can be seen as pointing to a 
mode of existence in which we do acknowledge this whole and do so precisely by 
being a whole ourselves. 
Reminding ourselves of the terms in which Heidegger describes inauthenticity 
may make this proposal—which I can no more than sketch here—seem at least a little 
less odd. The life of the inauthentic, let us recall, is one of “dispersal”, “distraction” 
and “disconnectedness” (SZ 390, 347, 371). It is a life of “inconstancy 
[Unständigkeit]”, in which one is “absorbed in the everyday multiplicity and the rapid 
succession of that with which one is concerned”, “the endless multiplicity of 
possibilities which offer themselves as closest to one” (SZ 337, 321, 384). In the midst 
of this “jumble of hovering possibilities”, the inauthentic person “drift[s] back and 
forth between ‘worldly’ possibilities which it has not seized upon” (SZ 342, 344). 
At the same time though, it is a life of fixation or “falling”, one in which we 
“cling” to “what is proximally at [our] everyday disposal”: the inauthentic person 
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“[b]usily los[es] himself in the object of his concern” (SZ 195, 410). All “other 
possibilities” are “crowded out” or “closed off” and what remains—those objects so 
understood—“becomes the ‘real world’” (SZ 195). Similarly—to introduce a temporal 
theme to which we will return—there is a sense in which inauthentic Dasein “always 
live[s] in the present” (WDR 169): it “orients its concerns to the now” (WDR 170), 
“leap[ing] away from its authentic future and from its authentic having been” (SZ 
349). 
We may “drift” then from one mode of “losing ourselves” to the next in this 
“rapid succession of that with which one is concerned”; but we do so in a mode of 
“tranquilization” (SZ 189). It can be ‘tranquil’ because, in this “inconstancy”—this 
Unständigkeit—we do not achieve the authentic person’s “steadfastness 
[Standfestigkeit]”—her “having achieved some sort of a 
position” [Standgewonnenhaben]” (SZ 322)—a position from which such inconstancy 
might manifest itself to us. The authentic person achieves a single over-arching 
perspective—or ‘position’—on life, a general view of things that might be called her 
own, and which expresses—though typically only implicitly—an assessment of which 
of the ‘multiplicity of possibilities which offer themselves’ to her are most 
worthwhile. The possibilities on which the inauthentic person acts, on the other hand, 
change as he moves from role to role and context to context. As a result, he is 
recognizably “dispersed” and does not live life as a whole. Instead his actions express 
a shifting and fluctuating conglomeration of perspectives, with none of which he can 
be identified. “[T]he inauthentic Being of Dasein” is Dasein “als unganzes”—as “less 
than a whole”, or as Stambaugh puts it, “fragmentary” (SZ 233). 
Heidegger describes the inauthentic person’s “losing himself in the object of 
his concern” as a “levelling off of Dasein’s possibilities to what is proximally at its 
everyday disposal”, and as “a dimming down of the possible as such” (SZ 195). The 
authentic person’s ‘having achieved some sort of a position’ may evoke a closing 
down of possibilities—a narrowing of view; but, in fact, as we will see below, it is in 
their acceptance of the need for ‘some sort of a position’ that we see a take on things 
in general emerge, an experience that one might tentatively identify with one of 
‘Being in general’ or ‘as a whole’. One might articulate this proposal in a number of 
!  14
different ways and the next two sections will explore how Heidegger’s discussions of 
‘guilt’ and ‘Being-towards-death’ might be seen to do so. 
6. Guilt 
To return to the terms used in OET (quoted above), the adoption of one 
‘measure’ at the exclusion of others expresses—one might say—an evaluation of 
“beings as a whole”, in this adoption’s taking one particular aspect of beings as 
worthy of comprehension. Indeed one faces the problem of unifying one’s 
understanding of the world in this way whenever one acts: there may be many 
principled demands arising out of a situation and, when we act, we select among those 
demands, thereby expressing an assessment of what overall is most important. To be 
an actor we must condense the multi-dimensional world that we confront into a 
world. In doing so, we—as finite creatures—cannot avoid the possibility that the act 
we perform will not address all the demands that we may recognize. As a result, our 
existence is marked by an “ontological” or “absolute” “guilt”. 
Heidegger explains his notion of ‘guilt’ by reference to two ‘nullities’, 
according to the second of which  
in having a potentiality-for-Being [Dasein] always stands in one possibility or 
another: it constantly is not other possibilities, and it has waived these in its 
existentiell projection. … Freedom … is only in the choice of one possibility – 
that is, in tolerating one’s not having chosen the others and one’s not being 
able to choose them. (SZ 285) 
In WDR, we read: 
Every action is at the same time something marked by guilt. For the 
possibilities of action are limited in comparison with the demands of 
conscience, so that every action that is successfully carried out produces 
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conflicts. To choose self-responsibility, then, is to become guilty in an absolute 
sense. Insofar as I am at all, I become guilty whenever I act in any sense. 
(WDR 169)  
There is nothing one can do to alleviate such ‘guilt’, as it is inherent in our nature as 
finite creatures—creatures who cannot be in two places at once. But—in a way that 
the next section will make clearer—inauthenticity is a way of ‘fleeing’ this ‘guilt’—of 
pretending it is not a fact of life—and authenticity a way of acknowledging it. When 
authentic, I achieve a unifying perspective on things, to which corresponds a ‘horizon’ 
against which I project what one might provisionally call an understanding of ‘Being 
in general’: an appreciation of the aspect of things revealed by the measure upon 
which I act, the indefinitely many other aspects of things revealed by the measures 
upon which I do not act, and the fact that when I act—indeed “[i]nsofar as I am at 
all”—I express an evaluating unification of that multiplicity. But any such unification 
rests on a further unifying understanding in light of which the authentic live and 
which—by virtue of that further depth—has a better claim to be the ‘horizon’ we are 
seeking to ‘recall’. 
7. Death and ecstatic temporality 
In taking passages like WM 87 as presenting a picture of grasping ‘Being as a 
whole’, I overlooked, of course, its explicitly concerning beings as a whole; this 
might seem to be a prime example of Seinsvergessenheit, and my talk of the 
possibility of a unified ‘take on things' might be seen as augmenting this confusion. 
But following the clue of OET 143 and 148, I used the latter expression to refer to a 
unifying ranking of ‘measures’ and—thereby—of those aspects of things upon which 
one might act, the ways in which they may be. For that reason, I have so far taken 
such a ranking as a not-unreasonable approximation for a ‘grasp of Being in general’. 
But can this first approximation be trusted, or might it itself rest on a deeper 
disclosure more deserving of such a label? ‘[A]ll ontological interpretations are more 
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like a groping about than an inquiry clear in its method’ (BP 322), and might we have 
not yet got to the bottom of the influence on our reflections of ‘the domination of the 
substantial’?  25
Recognition of ontological guilt yields a unification that gives one sense to 
authentic Dasein’s ‘Being-a-whole’—yielding a kind of synchronic wholeness in the 
many ‘ways of being’ upon which one might act. But this presupposes a kind of 
diachronic wholeness and hence temporality—and a particular kind of temporality— 
now comes to the fore.  One way of looking at the dream of somehow disowning 26
‘ontological guilt’ is as an unwillingness to be someone who acts on particular 
measures at the cost of not acting on others. Since such a cost is an inescapable part of 
what it is for a finite creature to act at all, this would be a refusal to perform 
  Another kind of worry one might raise concerning my ‘first approximation’ is 25
whether Dasein’s unified grasp of the array of possibilities of action open to it can be 
identified even provisionally with a grasp of various modes of being—a worry one 
might raise in at least two different ways. (1) One might propose that, when one acts, 
one understands the entities upon which one acts as—and only as—zuhanden. A case 
can be made for such a view (cf., e.g., Rouse 1985 and Blattner 1994 for some 
relevant thoughts) but I have argued elsewhere (McManus 2-12: sec. 3.4) that it 
remains problematic: in particular, it is hard to establish an interpretation of such a 
view that gives it both substance and the necessary breadth. (2) One might think that 
the unity of Being concerns the unity of very broad ontological kinds rather than that 
of many different and particular ‘measures’ on which one might act. But if—contra 
(1)—we can indeed act on the basis of entities being so where this is not simply a 
matter of their Zuhandenheit, then the unified grasp of entities being so that is 
necessary for action must be capable of encompassing all the different ways that such 
entities can be so; the ‘horizon’ against which entities—as understood through many 
different ‘measures’—are projected must also be one against which the many—
though presumably fewer—ontological kinds that they instantiate are projected.
 Though I concentrate here on one particular notion of diachronic wholeness, I do 26
not discount the relevance of others, such as that explored in various ways in the work 
of Charles Guignon. Cf., e.g., Guignon 2000.
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determinate acts, a refusal to be a particular person; it would be a denial of one’s 
having a particular identity in favour of a dream of being “everywhere and 
nowhere” (SZ 177, 347). Now this clearly is a dream and a ‘tranquilizing’ one at that; 
but to see how one might come to dream it, let us note how a certain denial of death 
plays its part. 
The thought is simple. “Freedom” is not “the choice of one possibility” and 
“tolerating one’s not having chosen the others” if one can make up for that choice by 
acting on those others later; “the possibilities of action” are not “limited in 
comparison with the demands of conscience” if one can meet later the demands one 
does not meet now. But clearly this assuages our (ontological) guilt only on one 
condition, namely, that “[t]here is still plenty of time” (CTR 69). “Death certainly 
comes, but not right away” (SZ 258) is the inauthentic person’s characteristic 
“pushing away and suppressing [of] ‘the thought of death’” (PIRA 118): he “pushes 
away the indefiniteness of death”—“the possibility that it can come at any 
moment”—“into the realm of postponement” (WDR 167, HCT 317).  Such a 27
‘pushing away’ denies the need for a singular (unifying) response to the situation in 
which we find ourselves obliged to act, and the attendant ‘ontological guilt’ it brings 
with it. For such a pseudo-agent, “all doors are open”; “everything is within its reach” 
as it “float[s] unattached” and “uprooted”, “never dwelling anywhere” (SZ 177, 170, 
173). 
In this way, inauthenticity brings with it a certain denial of one’s past—of 
one’s thrown, determinate situatedness through which one can live in only a single 
way—and one’s future—in particular, the certain “possibility of impossibility”, the 
possibility that one may not be able to make up for some of the choices one does not 
make, and the necessity that one cannot make up for all. Acknowledgement of this 
‘finite temporality’ (SZ 348) of ours is then, in contrast, the living of life against the 
horizon of what Heidegger calls an “ecstatic temporality”, our being “held out” into 
our past and finite future; when authentic, 
 Cf. also SZ 253, 255 and HCT 315.27
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the Present is not only brought back from distraction with the objects of one’s 
closest concern, but it gets held in the future and in having been. (SZ 338) 
This is the (diachronic) ‘horizon’ that one must deny if one is to spare oneself the 
‘guilt’-laden task of achieving a (synchronic) take on one’s life as a whole and its 
“possibilities of action”. Correspondingly, this is the horizon that the authentic 
acknowledge—live in the light of—by being-a-whole, by resisting the temptation to 
be the “dispersed” everyone and no-one that is the They-self. Whatever content one’s 
take on things in general may be—whatever ‘position one achieves’—this is the 
‘horizon’ against which that such a take will be ‘projected’. 
There is, I think, a certain architectonic aptness to the idea that Dasein does 
not acknowledge Being as a whole unless it itself is-a-whole, an aptness which 
Heidegger’s picture of the inauthentic person as being “less than a whole” makes 
vivid.  Such a person “clings” to particular possibilities while all others are “dimmed 28
down”—a ‘fragmentary’ Dasein encountering only a fragment of the world. The 
authentic person, in contrast, embodies an appreciation of that full range of 
possibilities and a recognition of the need to unify them not only if she is to act but 
“[i]nsofar as [she is] at all”. But we then dug deeper and saw how the inauthentic 
must “liv[e] always in the present”. By thinking through what is implicit in the 
 Heidegger identifies authentic Being-a-whole with ‘individualization’ (cf., e.g. SZ 28
266) and the importance that my reading assigns to our understanding the unity of the 
subject that intends Being in general for our understanding of Being in general and its 
unity makes unsurprising connections such as that proposed in the following: “Being, 
as the basic theme of philosophy, is no class or genus of entities, yet it pertains to 
every entity. … Being is the transcendens pure and simple. And the transcendence of 
Dasein’s Being is distinctive in that it implies the possibility and the necessity of the 
most radical individuation.” (SZ 38) There are also clear Kantian echoes here and my 
reading suggests connections with themes in the discussion of transcendental 
apperception, to which a number of Heidegger’s comments on SZ’s unwritten sections 
allude (cf., e.g., SZ 319 n. xvi). (McManus 2013b: sec. 6 identifies other Kantian 
aspects of the Being and Time project.)
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authentic person’s synchronic grasp of ‘Being in general’—as we might be tempted to 
describe such a unifying grasp of “possibilities of action”—we uncovered a further 
diachronic horizon in acknowledgement of which it is distinctive of such a person to 
live, that of an “ecstatic” time in which one is “held in the future and in having been”. 
Elucidating that horizon—and at least part of the work that Division Three was to do 
was surely that—is elucidating what it is that those who live in the light of such a 
synchronic grasp of Being in general live in the light of, the further diachronic 
‘horizon’ against which their distinctive form of understanding is ‘projected’. 
8. Concluding thoughts 
The devil, of course, is in the detail. The above discussion is without doubt 
speculative, has passed at great speed over a lot of very difficult terrain, assuming a 
host of interpretive decisions without justification, raising as many questions as it is 
answers, and no doubt inviting many objections. In this last section, I will consider 
one such objection. Responding to it will help clarify the proposal that my discussion 
offers but also point to limitations we must surely encounter in attempting to confirm 
any proposal of this kind. 
For example, one might wonder how an acknowledgement of our ‘guilt’ can 
possibly set us on the road to a horizon for an understanding of Being in general. That 
acknowledgement may require an appreciation of the many ‘measures’ on which we 
might—but do not—act. But what does this ‘many’ denote? And ‘we’ meaning who? 
If it means ‘we thrown, factical individuals’—presented with a finite set of measures 
as ‘live options’, to use James’ expression (James 1956, 3)—then it is not clear that 
acknowledging that range of possibilities can be any analogue of the Socratic “look 
down upon life and existence in general”. 
Or might it? I suggested above that it is the form rather than the content of the 
authentic ‘look’ that matters. My proposal makes key one’s escape from an 
inauthentic lostness in “the object of one’s concern”. One might understand this as the 
failure to recognize that this aspect of reality upon which one is acting is but one 
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possible basis for action. But this under-describes inauthentic lostness. In such a 
condition, one fails to recognize the aspect of reality upon which one acts as a 
possibility, one instance of a generality that is ‘ways things can be’; when all other 
ways that things can be are “crowded out” or “closed off”, one is left confronting not 
even—so to speak—one possibility, because the horizon against which it would show 
itself as a possibility is obscured.  Instead, as Heidegger puts it, one confronts what 
one simply takes as the “real world”. From this perspective, the inauthentic person’s 
failure does not contrast with—say —the authentic persons’ (somehow) 
acknowledging all possibilities of every possible Dasein, but instead with their 
acknowledging the factical possibilities that they do have as possibilities. 
The latter recognition is of a multiplicity of ways things can be and, as such, it 
presupposes an appreciation of a broader concept under which (what we now see as) 
those instances are subsumed; this appreciation is a grasp of what it is for something 
to count as a ‘way of being’, rather than some more concrete but facticity-denying 
familiarity with each and every instance of that broader concept. To offer (what may 
be more than merely) an analogy, this would be akin to knowing what counts as a 
reason, rather than knowing all the reasons on which it is possible for a person to act. 
This might seem to leave us with a rather thin notion of ‘Being in general’. 
But does it? Let us recall that the horizon on to which our understanding is projected 
when we display a mastery of the above unity in ‘ways of being’ turns out to be that 
of a presupposed and, hence, deeper unity—that of ecstatic temporality. Is that a thin 
notion? Heidegger insists that “the idea of Being in general is just as far from being 
‘simple’ as is the Being of Dasein” (SZ 196); and ecstatic temporality playing a key 
role in both would seem to confirm that. 
More importantly, is the resultant idea of ‘Being in general’ likely to be too 
thin to do the work the Being and Time project requires it to do? We have a flavour of 
the kind of work that project was to have done in the discussion in Chapter Four of 
Division Two of the temporality of understanding, Befindlickeit, falling and discourse. 
Heidegger offers this discussion as showing that these phenomena ‘in principle 
cannot be clarified in terms of the “now”’ (SZ 338). Rather 
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The ecstatical unity of temporality—that is, the unity of the “outside-of-itself” 
in the raptures of the future, of what has been, and of the Present—is the 
condition for the possibility that there can be an entity which exists as its 
“there”. (SZ 350) 
He makes parallel cases concerning our “circumspective concern” with the Zuhanden 
and the “theoretical discovery of the Vorhanden” (SZ352, 356). In grasping them, we 
“make use of time”: we grasp these kinds of Being too “in their temporal 
constitution” (BP 291); and hence, one might see here an attempt to show that not 
only Dasein but these phenomena too only show themselves against the horizon of 
ecstatic temporality, a common horizon that provides a basis for our “calling these 
different ways of Being ways of Being” (BP 176, quoted above). 
 But any candidate concept of ‘Being in general’ needs to do significantly more 
than that. In criticising Aristotle’s proposal that the question, “what is Being?”, “is 
just the question, what is substance?” (Aristotle, Metaphysics Z 1028b4), Heidegger 
stresses that the “many ways” in which “Being” is “said” can be understood in 
narrower and wider senses.  In addition to the unity that renders being Dasein, 
Zuhandenheit and Vorhandenheit ‘ways of Being’, we must also establish a unity that 
subsumes these plus Being’s further “regions” of “accidental and non-accidental 
Being,” “true and untrue Being,” and “potential and actual Being” (AM 9).   29
Can then the horizon that is ecstatic temporality—on a thin or yet-to-be-
articulated thicker construal—deliver an account of ‘Being in general’ that can meet 
 This echoes Brentano’s identification of the problematic diversity to be unified as 29
that of “Being according to the figures of the categories” plus “accidental Being”, 
“Being in the sense of being true” and “potential and actual Being” (Brentano 1975). 
Recognition of the need to accommodate these further ‘regions’ gives further 
substance to the tentativeness of my ‘first approximation’ above (see sec. 7) of what 
‘Being in general’ must subsume. But perhaps the trickiest case—of all such 
candidate further ‘regions of Being’—is that of the Being of the ‘horizon’ that is 
ecstatic temporality. See n. 34 below.
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these needs?  I do not know how far one can go in resolving these matters.  30 31
Heidegger himself explicitly mentions in Being and Time the need to ‘clarify the 
ontological meaning of the kind of talk in which we say that “there is truth”’ (SZ 
214),  but then kicks the question of how we are to handle this need into the long 32
grass of Division Three. “Being and truth ‘are’ equiprimordially” and “Being . . . is 
something which ‘there is’ only in so far as truth is”; but even the “concrete asking” 
of the question, “What does it signify that Being ‘is’?”—let alone answering it—is 
possible for us “only if the meaning of Being and the full scope of the understanding 
of Being have in general been clarified” (SZ 230). And there the matter is left. 
Heidegger himself suggests he had succumbed to a “delusion” in thinking he 
had in mind a project for Division Three that could be rendered clear;  I have also 33
offered reasons elsewhere for thinking there may be a problem of principle inherent in 
the attempt to articulate the horizon upon which ‘Being in general’ is ‘projected’.  If 34
 Heidegger sees Aristotle’s discussion of substance as leaving this broader unity 30
“obscure” (AM 38).
 There also remains the task of convincing us that ontology as we know it has indeed 31
played itself out—however unwittingly or confusedly—against the background that 
the above account tries to identify, the task perhaps of the ‘torso’s’ other missing 
parts, the three divisions that would have been Part Two. In making his claims about 
the horizon against which an understanding of Being in general is possible, Heidegger 
is also making a claim about “the basic theme of philosophy” (SZ 38)—indeed about 
“the inner and hidden life of the basic movement of Western philosophy” (MFL 154)
—a claim which needs to demonstrate its historical plausibility.
 Cf. LQT 23: “There are automobiles, Negroes, Abelian functions, Bach’s fugues. 32
‘Are there’ truths too? Or how could it be otherwise?”
 Cf. the letter to Jaspers quoted above.33
 Cf. McManus 2013b: sec. 7. The problem concerns how we are to understand the 34
Being of that horizon itself, indeed whether it can coherently be said to possess a 
mode of Being—and be said to be or to be thus-and-so—while still performing the 
‘function’ Heidegger assigns it.
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that problem is insurmountable, attempts to make sense of the Being and Time project 
must fail in the end; and a difficulty that we face in trying to understand the texts that 
we do have is knowing when the principle of charity—and the expectation that a good 
reading of those texts will make sense of them—should be set aside.  35
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